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THE HOWEY TEST TURNS 64: ARE THE COURTS
GRADING THIS TEST ON A CURVE?
MIRIAM R. ALBERT∗
ABSTRACT
Sixty-four years ago, the Supreme Court decided SEC v. W.J. Howey,
crafting a definition for one form of security, known as an investment
contract. The Supreme Court’s definition of investment contract in Howey
is flexible, consistent with the Congressional approach to defining the
broader concept of what constitutes a security. This choice of adopting a
flexible definition for investment contract is not without cost, and raises
the specter of inconsistent interpretation and/or application by the lower
courts that threatens to undermine the utility of the Howey test itself as a
trigger for investor protection. The intentional breadth and adaptability of
the definition of investment contract necessarily leads to complex and factintensive judicial inquiries in the application thereof, and allows for
inconsistent results between and among the various courts engaging in
such inquiries, creating the possibility of similarly-situated litigants
winding up with dissimilar outcomes.
Examples of these disparate outcomes are present in a number of
industries, including the viatical settlement industry. Viatical settlements
are a form of “asset-backed securities” under which purchasers buy the
right to receive death benefits under life insurance policies from
policyholders. These days, the very words “asset-backed security” may
cause the public to recoil in horror, thinking of the sub-prime mortgage
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debacle and Bernard Madoff being led off in handcuffs while his
devastated victims sobbed on the evening news. But not all asset-backed
securities are problematic, and when undertaken legally and ethically,
these interests can be solid investment vehicles, providing needed liquidity
to the capital markets.
As the financial markets continue to grow and innovate, new forms of
asset-backed securities will likely be created, and the potential for inconsistent
treatment of similarly-situated investors in these asset-backed securities
arguably increases, prompting the question explored herein of whether the
definition of investment contract in the Howey test is too flexible to further the
underlying legislative intent of the federal securities laws to protect investors
through mandatory disclosure and anti-fraud liability. At present, investors
and issuers have no certainty as to the absolute parameters of the test or how
any given court will articulate or interpret the definition of investment
contract. The test has been burdened by judicially-imposed nuances, as judges
try to give meaning to the Supreme Court’s words, and as a consequence, has
triggered uneven applications.
This Article challenges the Howey test in light of today’s increasingly
complicated and volatile securities markets, focusing on whether the
underlying legislative goals of the federal securities laws are still met by
the Howey test, as currently construed by the courts. The Article provides
an overview of the legislative history and current status of the U.S. law on
the definition of investment contracts, with a brief examination of the
component parts of the Howey test, followed by a discussion of the current
regulation of the purchase of insurance policies from insurance policy
holders in viatical settlement transactions, as background for the analysis
highlighting the shortcomings of the Howey test discussed therein. The
Article examines the resale of interests in life insurance policies
purchased in viatical settlements, focusing on the inconsistent
characterization of viatical settlements by the federal courts, specifically
in the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Life Partners, Inc. and the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp. and offers
recommendations to further the underlying goals of the securities laws
with respect to investor protection through disclosure and anti-fraud
requirements in an effort to honor these goals without sacrificing
consistency for the very investors these laws were enacted to protect. The
Article ultimately concludes that the benefits of the flexibility of the Howey
test outweigh the costs in terms of dissimilar results for similar
investments and that the uneven applications of the Howey test by courts
should be considered necessary collateral damage, acceptable in light of
the significant protections still triggered by the Howey test.
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INTRODUCTION
Sixty-four years ago, the Supreme Court decided SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co.,1 crafting a definition for one form of security, known as an
investment contract. Discussion by judges and academics of the Supreme
Court’s definition of investment contract, which has come to be known as
the Howey test, has primarily focused on the individual components of the
test,2 virtually ignoring the more fundamental underlying question
explored in this Article, whether the Howey test itself furthers investor
protection through mandatory disclosure and anti-fraud liability, the
intended purpose of the federal securities laws.3 The Howey test seeks to
identify transactions in which investors are relying on others to manage
the enterprise that will produce financial returns on their investments.4 The
theory is that these investors need the disclosure that would come from
registration under the federal securities laws more than investors who are
themselves participating in the management of the enterprise.5
Under the Howey test, any interest that “involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts
of others" is an investment contract,6 thereby included within the
definition of “security” and subject to the rules and regulations of the

1

328 U.S. 293 (1946).
See Theresa A. Gabaldon, A Sense of Security: An Empirical Study, 25 J. CORP. L.
307 (2000):
[T]here have been no fewer than 792 cases decided and over 300 law
review articles written in which either the ‘33 or ‘34 Act definition of a
security has played a prominent role. There has been an ebb and flow in
the rate of production of these cases and articles with a sharp, although
perhaps temporary, decline in the period since 1993.
2

Much, if not most, of the law review commentary dealing with the
definition of a security takes inspiration from, and focuses on,
relatively few decisions. For instance, a number of authors have chosen
to critique one or more of the eleven Supreme Court cases that address
the definitional question. Another popular, and sometimes coterminous,
approach has assessed some single aspect of the meaning of security in
the context of the most significant cases.
Id. at 308-09.
3
According to the Supreme Court, the statutory purpose of the securities laws is
“compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of ‘the many types of
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.’”
Howey, 328 U.S. at 299 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933)).
4
Id. at 299.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 301.
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federal securities laws.7 The term “security” is defined broadly8 in both the
Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)9 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act).10 Both statutes provide a laundry list of examples and
categories of securities, including “any interest or instrument commonly
known as a ‘security,’”11 in an effort to include in the definition all of the
many types of instruments Congress predicted would or should fall within
the ordinary concept of what constitutes a security.12 Although there are
7

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). The threshold issue triggering the application of the
federal securities laws to any instrument is whether such instrument satisfies the statutory
definition of “security.” See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(10) (2006). The determination
that an instrument constitutes a security has far-reaching implications for both issuer and
holder. Issuers of securities have disclosure, anti-fraud and registration obligations
(absent any available exemption from registration). 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-g (2006). It is
unlawful to engage in the offer or sale of a security without registration or an exemption
listed in section 4 of the Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-e (2006). Holders
of securities have related rights and remedies for any violations by the issuer, including
the issuer’s defective registration or failure to register such securities. See 15 U.S.C. §§
77k-p.
8
According to the Supreme Court, Congress painted with a broad brush in defining
the scope of the market that it wished to regulate. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. It recognized
the virtually limitless scope of human ingenuity, especially in the creation of “countless
and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
promise of profits.” Id. So the Court concluded that Congress determined that the best
way to achieve its goal of protecting investors was to define the term “security” in
“sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that definition the many
types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a
security.” United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933)). “Congress therefore did not attempt precisely to cabin the
scope of the Securities Acts. Rather, it enacted a definition of ‘security’ sufficiently broad
to encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment.” Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990).
9
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
10
15 U.S.C. § 78c(10).
11
15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(10).
12
According to one commentator:
The term was included in the definitional section of the Federal
Securities Act of 1933, § 15 U.S.C. 77b, as well as many state
securities laws for a particular reason: the drafters of these statutes
realized that, at one point in time, they could not predict all the various
investment products the ingenuity of participants in the securities
business could concoct. In effect then, the term investment contract can
be analogized to an expansion joint as it provides flexibility and adds a
universal quality to the definition of investment security. This is
especially true in the federal domain, and in particular, the Securities
Act of 1933, § 15 U.S.C. 77a, et seq. It was because the courts imposed
an expansive construction of federal securities law that a definition
evolved for the term investment contract. For, standing alone, the term
would be meaningless.
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minor differences between the two statutes’ definitions, these differences
are not germane here for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has made
clear that the two statutory definitions are to be treated as the same.13
Second, and more relevant here, while both statutes include within their
respective definitions the term “investment contract,”14 neither statute
defines that term.15
Thus, when it comes to fleshing out what constitutes an investment
contract, the Supreme Court’s admonishment that “[t]he starting point in
every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself” is not
very helpful.16 In the absence of any statutory definition, the concept of
what constitutes an investment contract has been developed through
extensive case law, which provides a starting point for statutory
construction, and ultimately, statutory critique.17 These judicial decisions
take into account, to varying degrees, the underlying legislative purposes
of the federal securities laws18 to provide investor protection through
mandatory disclosure of the information investors need to make informed
Willis H. Riccio, The Ubiquitous Investment Contract, 56 R.I. BAR J. 15, 15 (2007).
13
The Supreme Court has consistently held that “[t]he definition of a security in
§ 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act ... is virtually identical [to the definition in the Securities Act
of 1933] and, for present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be considered the
same.” Forman, 421 U.S. at 847 n.12.
14
15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(10).
15
Id.
16
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
17
See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). Arguably, the groundwork
for the Howey decision was laid in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp. when the Court
noted that varying canons of construction would lead to overly narrow results and that
such canons should be subordinated to:
[T]he doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in
conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in light
of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words
fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally
expressed legislative policy.
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
18
According to the Supreme Court:
The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate
serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market. The focus of
the Acts is on the capital market of the enterprise system: the sale of
securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes, the exchanges on
which securities are traded, and the need for regulation to prevent fraud
and to protect the interest of investors. Because securities transactions
are economic in character Congress intended the application of these
statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction, and
not on the name appended thereto.
Forman, 421 U.S. at 849.
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investment decisions19 and, through anti-fraud liability, to put some teeth
into the mandatory disclosure requirements by imposing significant
penalties for violations thereof.20 As a result of the disclosure
requirements and anti-fraud liability, investors and securities markets
arguably will have the information needed to move capital to its optimal
uses.
These judicial decisions also reflect the desire for flexibility that is
manifest in the legislative history of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts.21
Congress intentionally avoided a rigid statutory definition of security in an
effort to give the courts flexibility in interpreting this important and farreaching concept.22 The definition of security thus encompasses stocks,
options, debt instruments, and other financial interests typically considered
to be securities.23 The definition has also been broadly interpreted to
include instruments that might not at first appear to be securities, such as
fractionalized interests in pools of home mortgage or auto loans, interests
in earthworm farms and chinchilla ranches, and various forms of pyramid
schemes, all of which have been classified as investment contracts under
the Howey test and thus have been deemed securities.24 The Securities and
19

See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (holding
that the primary purpose of the federal securities laws is to “substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor”). Moreover, “[o]ne of [the 1934
Act’s] central purposes is to protect investors through the requirement of full disclosure
by issuers of securities ….” Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). Thus, the
design of the statute was to “protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information
thought necessary to informed investment decisions.” SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (citing A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S.
38, 40 (1941)). “[T]he Court repeatedly has described the ‘fundamental purpose’ of the
Act as implementing a ‘philosophy of full disclosure ….’” Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) (quoting Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 186).
20
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-p (2006) (prescribe the forms of liability, actions, and remedies
against violators); see also Ralston, 346 U.S. at 124 n.10 (noting that the 1933 Act’s
second primary objective is to prevent fraud in the sale of securities).
21
See, e.g., SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (S.D. Fla.
2004), aff’d, 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[f]irst and foremost, the federal
securities laws were drafted and have consistently been interpreted from the perspective
that flexibility in the law's applicability is paramount”).
22
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (“Congress’ purpose in enacting
the securities laws was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by
whatever name they are called.”). To that end, the Court found that Congress enacted a
broad definition of “security,” sufficient “to encompass virtually any instrument that
might be sold as an investment.” Id.
23
15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(10).
24
Timothy P. Davis, Should Viatical Settlements Be Considered “Securities” Under
the 1933 Act?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 78 (1997) (noting that these interests have
all been characterized as “investment contracts,” and thus securities) (citing Smith v.
Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979) (earthworm farms); Miller v. Cent. Chinchilla
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Exchange Commission (SEC), in an effort to further investor protection,
has maintained with varying degrees of success that the concept of
investment contract should and/or does include many financial schemes
not specifically mentioned by the federal securities laws, thereby honoring
the Supreme Court’s instruction that, “in searching for the meaning and
scope of the word ‘security’… form should be disregarded for substance
and the emphasis should be on economic reality.”25
The Supreme Court’s definition of investment contract in Howey is
flexible, consistent with the congressional approach to defining the
broader concept of what constitutes a security.26 The choice of adopting a
flexible definition for investment contract is not without cost, however.
The intentional breadth and adaptability of the definition of investment
contract necessarily leads to complex and fact-intensive judicial inquiries
in the application thereof, and allows for the possibility of inconsistent
results between and among the various courts engaging in such inquiries,
creating the possibility of similarly-situated litigants winding up with
dissimilar outcomes.27 Indeed, the specter of inconsistent interpretation
and/or application by the lower courts arguably threatens to undermine the
utility of the Howey test itself as a trigger for investor protection.
Examples of these disparate outcomes are present in a number of
industries, including the viatical settlement industry. Viatical settlements
are a form of asset-backed security under which purchasers buy the right
to receive death benefits under life insurance policies from
policyholders.28 These days, the very words “asset-backed security” may
cause the public to recoil in horror, thinking of the sub-prime mortgage
debacle and Bernard Madoff being led off in handcuffs while his
Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1974) (chinchilla ranch); SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1973) (pyramid schemes)).
25
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
26
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975).
27
In one of the first Supreme Court cases to interpret the Howey test, the Court noted
that, in defining the term “security,” Congress was not attempting to:
[A]rticulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguishing “securities”
from “non-securities”…. The task has fallen to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the body charged with administering the
Securities Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide which of
the myriad financial transactions in our society come within the coverage
of these statutes.
Id. at 847-48.
28
Davis, supra note 24, at 75. Viatical settlements occur when insureds sell the right
to receive their life insurance policies to investors who typically pool multiple policies
and sell fractionalized interests in the pool. Id. The circuits are split on whether such an
interest constitutes a security. See infra Part III (discussing the two federal appellate
decisions considering this issue).
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devastated victims sobbed on the evening news. But not all asset-backed
securities are problematic, and, when undertaken legally and ethically,
these interests can be solid investment vehicles, providing needed liquidity
to the capital markets. Asset-backed securities include a wide array of
financial instruments that give investors a claim on the interest and
principal payments generated by a pool of assets, like mortgage loans, car
loans, or, in the case of viatical settlements, life insurance policies.29 As
the financial markets continue to grow and innovate, new forms of assetbacked securities will likely be created, and the potential for inconsistent
treatment of similarly-situated investors in these asset-backed securities
arguably increases, prompting the question explored herein of whether the
definition of investment contract in Howey is too flexible to further the
underlying legislative intent of the federal securities laws to protect
investors through mandatory disclosure and anti-fraud liability.30 At
present, investors and issuers have no certainty as to the absolute
parameters of the test or how any given court will articulate or interpret
the definition of investment contract.31 The test has been burdened by
judicially imposed nuances as judges try to give meaning to the Supreme
Court’s words, triggering uneven applications. The issue at hand is
whether these uneven applications are necessary collateral damage
balanced by the protections offered by the Howey test or a signal that the
test should be revised, reframed, or even retired as it approaches age sixtyfive.
The Howey test is analogous to that house in your neighborhood onto
which the owners build a myriad of new additions. The additions are in
roughly the same style as the original house, but are clearly additions, and
sometimes awkward additions at that. Some additions seem to have
nothing to do with the original house, and may even look unstable. The
consensus of neighbors with taste is that the house should be torn down
29

See O. Emre Ergungor, Securitization, ECON. COMMENT. (2003).
The federal securities laws were enacted "to restore the confidence of the
prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities." S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1
(1933); see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933).
31
See Kyle M. Globerman, Casenote, The Elusive and Changing Definition of a
Security: One Test Fits All, 51 FLA. L. REV. 271 (1999).
Nevertheless, the lack of uniformity that results from this ad hoc
method of review is problematic because investors cannot, with
predictability, determine if the transactions they engage in are within
the scope of the Security and Exchange Acts. In view of the varying
tests available to the judiciary, the legislature can achieve the intended
purpose of the Acts by rewriting the definition of a security to be any
transaction that satisfies the elements of a slightly modified Howey test.
Id. at 274-75.
30
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and rebuilt from scratch. In the case of the Howey test, our congressional
homeowner and, more importantly, the equally recalcitrant courts, refuse
to do so, piling on more additions, potentially threatening not just the
symmetry, but ultimately the integrity of the underlying structure.
Despite the volume of scholarly and judicial writings on Howey, much
of it critical,32 the Howey test is still good law and arguably has taken on a
quasi-statutory aura.33 This Article challenges the Howey test in light of
today’s increasingly complicated and volatile securities markets, focusing
on whether the underlying legislative goals of the federal securities laws
are still met by the Howey test, as currently construed by the courts. This
necessitates an overview of the legislative history and current status of
U.S. law on the definition of investment contracts, with a brief
examination of the component parts of the Howey test. Part I of this
Article will explore the statutory, case law, and academic discussion
centered on the definition of investment contract under U.S. law, including
a brief discussion of the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part II
discusses the current regulation of the purchase of insurance policies from
insurance policy holders in viatical settlement transactions as background
for the analysis in Part III highlighting the shortcomings of the Howey test
discussed therein.
Part III provides a critique of the current approach to defining
investment contracts and, using viatical settlements as a focal point,
demonstrates a weakness in our securities laws that can and has resulted in
otherwise identical investments triggering very different outcomes for
injured investors. This analysis will support the conclusion that the courts,
and by extension some state and federal lawmakers, have expressed a
reluctance, both implicit and explicit, to pin down a specific definition of
investment contract, leaving this task to any willing state court or
legislature. The Article will further demonstrate that a cost of this
reluctance is that similarly situated litigants are denied reliably consistent
remedies—certainly with respect to the ultimate boundaries of such a
definition. Part III also examines the resale of interests in life insurance
policies purchased in viatical settlements, focusing on the inconsistent
characterization of viatical settlements by the federal courts, specifically in
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.34 and the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp.35
32

See Gabaldon, supra note 2, at 308-09.
Riccio, supra note 12, at 15; see, e.g., SEC v. Charles E. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389
(2004) (where the Court reverses a lower court ruling that conflicts with the Howey test).
34
87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
35
408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005).
33
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Part IV questions the characterization of viatical settlements under
state statutory and case law, offering recommendations to further the
underlying goals of the securities laws with respect to investor protection
through disclosure and anti-fraud requirements in an effort to honor these
goals without sacrificing consistency for the very investors these laws
were enacted to protect. This Article ultimately concludes that the benefits
of the flexibility of the Howey test outweigh the costs in terms of
dissimilar results for similar investments and that the uneven applications
of the Howey test by courts should be considered necessary collateral
damage acceptable in light of the significant protections still triggered by
the Howey test.
I. DEFINING “INVESTMENT CONTRACT”
Before the Supreme Court decided Howey, and before Congress
enacted the 1933 Act, courts struggled to concretize a meaning for the
term investment contract.36 The term had no standard meaning in any
commercial context, yet appeared in many states’ blue sky laws predating
the 1933 Act, always without a statutory definition.37 Conceptually, the
lack of a statutory definition provides an opportunity for progress on both
the disclosure and anti-fraud fronts. Courts have the flexibility to bring
within the reach of the securities laws those interests that would not
otherwise constitute securities, but nonetheless are the kind of investments
that trigger a need for investor protection through mandatory, accurate
disclosure. This flexibility also creates the opportunity for inconsistent or
unsound interpretations of the definition, potentially triggering instability
for the investing public.
State and lower federal courts attempted to flesh out the definition of
investment contract, seeking a definition, the interpretation of which
would ideally cover any investment scheme that triggered an investor’s
need for the protection of the securities laws.38 The Supreme Court, in
36

See Larry Soderquist, Reach of the Securities Act Regulation, 1490 PLI/CORP. 113,
116 (2005).
37
Id.
38
According to the Supreme Court:
Form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon
economic reality. An investment contract thus came to mean a contract
or scheme for “the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way
intended to secure income or profit from its employment.” This
definition was uniformly applied by state courts to a variety of
situations where individuals were led to invest money in a common
enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit solely
through the efforts of the promoter or of some one other than
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crafting the original Howey test, tipped its hat to the judicial and
legislative history surrounding the definition of investment contract.39 The
Court noted that the term investment contract had been “broadly construed
by state courts so as to afford the investing public a full measure of
protection.”40
The state court definition of investment contract evolved over time,
and served as the basic framework for the test the Supreme Court
ultimately crafted in Howey.41 The Court noted that this definition had
been uniformly applied by the state courts “to a variety of situations where
individuals were led to invest money in a common enterprise with the
expectation that they would earn a profit solely through the efforts of the
promoter or of some one [sic] other than themselves.”42 The Court found
the prior judicial interpretation of the term to be reasonable, both because
Congress had used the same interpretation, and because the Court found
the interpretation to be consistent with the statutory aims of “compelling
full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of ‘the many types of
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept
of a security.’”43 The Court went on to state the oft-quoted language that
themselves.
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (quoting State v. Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920)).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. According to one commentator, the federal courts looked to the state courts for
guidance on defining investment contract:
Initially, federal courts followed suit and looked to how states were
defining and interpreting the term "investment contract" as per their
Blue Sky laws. By 1941 the lower federal courts began expanding on
the principles established by states and developing their own method
for defining and analyzing the investment contract issue. While the
form of the transaction was given careful consideration, courts were
willing to "look through the form to discover the real nature of the
transaction." In doing so, it was determined that "an 'investment
contract' ... is one which contemplates the entrusting of money or other
capital to another, with the expectation of deriving a profit or income
therefrom, to be created through the efforts of others.”
Christopher L. Borsani, A “Common” Problem: Examining the Need for Common
Ground in the “Common Enterprise” Element of the Howey Test, 10 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1, 4
(2008).
43
Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
By including an investment contract within the scope of § 2(1) of the
Securities Act, Congress was using a term the meaning of which had
been crystallized by this prior judicial interpretation. It is therefore
reasonable to attach that meaning to the term as used by Congress,
especially since such a definition is consistent with the statutory aims.
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this interpretation of the term investment contract “embodies a flexible
rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the
money of others on the promise of profits.”44
Before Howey, the SEC brought various actions in support of its view
that the concept of investment contract should be construed broadly to
include a variety of financial schemes not specifically mentioned by the
federal securities laws.45 In bringing the Howey facts to a trial court, the
SEC contended that the activities of the W.J. Howey Company and its
sister service corporation, Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. (Howey
Service) constituted the sale of unregistered securities in violation of
section 5(a) of the 1933 Act;46 it sought an injunction to prevent the
companies from using the mails and the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce in the offer and sale of these interests.47 Each prospective
investor was offered both a land sales contract from W.J. Howey
Company and a service contract from Howey Service, and all were told
that it was not feasible to invest in the grove without a service contract,48
presumably because the investors would have no ability to tend to the trees
themselves and needed to outsource this critical function. The investors
took this to heart, and of the fifty-one parcels sold during the time period
relevant to the litigation, forty-two purchasers entered into service
agreements with Howey Service.49 The SEC claimed that, because the
Id. at 298; see H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933).
44
Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
45
See, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (sales of oilproducing land leases).
46
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714, 715 (5th Cir. 1945), rev’d, 328 U.S. 293
(1946). The Fifth Circuit found:
[T]he two companies under the same common control, with the same
officers, facilities, and personnel, and substantially the same
stockholders, were engaged in carrying on an investment business, towit, the growth and cultivation of citrus trees and the marketing and
sale of fruit therefrom; that by the device of deeds from the Howey
Company to the groves, and cultivation and management contracts
from the Service Company, they were in substance and effect selling
investment contracts to customers in that, though the purchasers of
groves paid their money in form as purchasers of specific tracts of land,
they were in fact investors with the Howey Companies in a citrus
growing and marketing enterprise, the profits from their purchases to be
derived not from their own skill and efforts but from the skill and
efforts of others.
Id.
47
Howey, 328 U.S. at 294.
48
Id. at 295.
49
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 60 F. Supp. 440, 441 (S.D. Fla. 1945), aff’d, 151 F.2d
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investment interests had to be accompanied by a service contract, the
investors were purchasing securities.50 The trial court disagreed with the
SEC and denied the relief requested.51
The trial court’s reasoning provides insight into the then-current
judicial thinking about the definition of security. The trial court focused on
the established nature of the citrus industry in Florida,52 primarily to
contrast earlier precedent, where the same trial court found the sale of land
contracts in the “new untried and undeveloped industry”53 of tung oil to be
the sale of investment contracts, and thus securities, because of the
remedial nature of the 1933 Act.54 This idea, that offerings from
established firms were not investment contracts but that somehow,
otherwise substantially similar offerings from new or undeveloped
industries were investment contracts, is not supportable under the
legislative history of the 1933 Act, nor is it consistent with the judicial
thinking underlying prior state cases.55 The SEC thus eventually brought
the case to the Supreme Court, seeking judicial clarification of the
definition of investment contract.56
714 (5th Cir. 1945), rev’d, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 442.
52
Id. (noting that the long established citrus industry “antedates the building of railroads in the State and its progress has been such that it is the largest single farming
activity in the State today”).
53
Id.
54
SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1941). Discussing the application
of the Securities Act, the trial court found:
The Securities Act is remedial in nature, to be liberally construed. It
affects, not ordinary land sale contracts, but ‘investment contracts‘
which evidence primarily a right to participate in the proceeds of an
income-producing venture, membership in which is secured through
entrusting an investor's capital to the management of others. In
appraising contracts for the purpose of determining the applicability of
the statute, courts readily look through the form to discover the real
nature of the transaction. Labels affixed by the parties are of little
moment.
Id.; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 60 F. Supp. 440, 442 (S.D. Fla. 1945), aff’d, 151
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1945), rev’d, 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Howey trial court relied on the
fact that, during the time period relevant to the suit, all the purchasers had actually
inspected the property. Id. This lays the groundwork nicely for the last prong of the
Supreme Court’s Howey test, requiring that the profits of the investment contract “come
solely from the efforts of others.” SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
Since the purchasers had all physically inspected the land before buying the land, they
were involved enough in the process to arguably not need the protections of registration
under the 1933 Act.
55
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
56
Id. at 294.
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The Supreme Court then articulated the original Howey test that,
although refined over time by subsequent case law, is still the current test
for classifying interests as investment contracts, and embodies what the
Supreme Court considers the “essential attributes that run through all the
Court’s decisions defining a security.”57 The Supreme Court articulated
the Howey test as follows: “The test is whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely
from the efforts of others.”58 The Howey test isolates transactions in which
ownership is separated from control,59 which suggests the importance of
mandatory disclosure and higher liability standards to ensure that investors
allocate capital to its highest-valued uses.60 The test is entirely consistent
with the investor protection goal of the federal securities laws.
Returning to the house analogy discussed earlier, the four prongs of
the test constitute the original house. Judicial interpretations, especially
judicially-imposed additions and bright-line tests, constitute the remodels
and extensions to the initial structure that some neighbors may think are
appropriate while others worry about the structural integrity of the entire
house. As a matter of common sense, there is a limit to how much
additional weight any one structure can hold in total, with similar, smaller
calculations necessary to determine how much weight any one particular
part of the structure can withstand. So too with the Howey test: judicial
additions to some of the components may be supportable on their own, but
the cumulative effect may call into question the structural integrity of the
entire test.
Numerous litigants have explored the parameters of the Howey test,
but litigation involving Howey does not tend to focus on the validity or
correctness of the test itself; rather the cases focus on the specific meaning
of one or more of the component parts.61 Courts typically break the test
into four parts: a transaction constitutes an investment contract, and thus a
security, triggering the application of the federal securities laws if (1) the
purchaser invests money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with the
expectation of profits; (4) solely from the efforts of others.62 Other
commentators have already dissected the components of the Howey test at
length,63 and thus only a brief overview of the test is provided, in order to
57

United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
59
Id. (the Howey test focuses on profits resulting “from the efforts of others”).
60
See supra note 19-20 and accompanying text.
61
Gary M. Brown, Reach of Securities Act Regulation, 1756 PLI/CORP. 177, 183
(2009).
62
Id.
63
See generally Borsani, supra note 42; Brown, supra note 61.
58
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offer context for the later challenge of the inconsistent outcomes for
similarly-situated investors that flow from differing judicial interpretations
and additions to the test.
First prong: investment of money. The first prong of the Howey test
requires that the purchaser of the investment contract invest money into
the enterprise.64 This prong is rarely litigated, as proponents typically can
establish an investment of something of value.65 The Supreme Court relied
on State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co.66 for the framework underlying this
component of the test, building on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
definition in Gopher Tire that “[t]he placing of capital or laying out of
money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment
is an ‘investment’ as that word is commonly used and understood.”67 The
investment of money criterion is satisfied if one puts out consideration
with the hope of some future return.68
Second prong: commonality. The second prong of the Howey test
requires that the investment of money be in a “common enterprise.”69 The
Supreme Court did not explicitly define the term “common enterprise” in
Howey, but the Court did implicitly define the term by holding that the
investors in Howey had satisfied this prong.70 In the absence of guidance
from the Supreme Court, the lower courts have taken up the issue and
fleshed out the definition of a common enterprise.71 These lower court
definitions focus on the extent to which the success of the investor’s
interest rises and falls with others involved in the enterprise, including the
other investors or the promoter, with three different judicial standards
emerging to satisfy the requirement of a common enterprise.72
Three circuits require a form of common enterprise known as
horizontal commonality, which focuses on the connection between the
individual investor and other investors in the enterprise.73 This form of
64

Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. Although the investment of money prong has not been at
issue in any of the viatical settlements litigations at either the federal or state level and so
is not central to the analysis herein, this brief mention is included for the sake of
completeness.
65
But see Shannon L. Thompson, Securities Regulation in a Virtual World, 16
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 89, 103 (2009) (discussing potentially problematic “virtual world
currencies” and whether their value in “virtual world investments” can satisfy the first
prong of the Howey test).
66
177 N.W. 937 (Minn. 1920); Brown, supra note 61, at 184.
67
Gopher Tire, 177 N.W. at 938.
68
Soderquist, supra note 36, at 119.
69
Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
70
Id. at 300.
71
Borsani, supra note 42, at 7.
72
Id. at 7, n.40.
73
Horizontal commonality has been adopted by the Third, Sixth and Seventh
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commonality requires that investors share the risk of the enterprise,
usually through a pooling of funds. When horizontal commonality is
present, multiple investors have interrelated interests in a common scheme
and their fortunes are interwoven; they pool resources, share profits and
share losses on a pro rata basis.74
Other circuits look for vertical commonality between the investor and
the promoter of the scheme, which requires that the promoter and at least
one investor share the risk.75 When vertical commonality is present, one
single investor has a common interest with the manager of his investment
so that the investor’s fortunes are inextricably interwoven with and
dependent on the fortunes of the promoter/manager of the enterprise.76
Vertical commonality has been further broken down into two subparts:
strict vertical commonality and broad vertical commonality.77 Strict
vertical commonality has its roots in a footnote from SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Enterprises, Inc.,78 in which the Ninth Circuit noted that “a
common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the investor are
interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those
seeking the investment or of third parties.”79 Strict vertical commonality
thus requires “the fortunes of the investor to be commingled with, and
dependent upon the success of the promoter.”80 The Ninth Circuit,
currently the only proponent of this form of common enterprise, looks for
the fortunes of the investor to be commingled with and dependent on the
success or failure of the promoter, requiring that the promoter have a
financial stake in the investment at issue.81
Broad vertical commonality has its roots in SEC v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc.82 Like strict vertical commonality, this approach looks
Circuits. See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222
(6th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d
96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977); Wasnowic v. Chi. Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (M.D.
Pa. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973).
74
Borsani, supra note 42, at 8.
75
Brown, supra note 61, at 185.
76
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973).
77
The Fifth, Eleventh and Ninth Circuits have adopted vertical commonality, with
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits adopting a broad vertical commonality approach and
leaving the Ninth Circuit standing alone as a proponent of strict vertical commonality.
See Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990); Brodt v. Bache & Co.,
595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479
(5th Cir. 1974).
78
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
79
Id. at 482 n.7.
80
Borsani, supra note 42, at 10.
81
Id.
82
497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).

18

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:001

to the connection between the fortunes of the investor and the fortunes of
the promoter.83 Broad vertical commonality focuses on the efforts of the
promoter, requiring that the investor be dependent on the promoter.84 The
promoter need not benefit from the investment under this form of
commonality.85
These three approaches to finding a common enterprise illustrate the
courts’ response to the flexibility of the Howey test, and provide an
example of the judicial remodeling of the original structure of the test.
While some investments satisfy both horizontal and vertical commonality,
some may satisfy only one. Thus, which circuit ultimately reviews a
particular investment and rules on whether it constitutes a security is
critical, leading to the very real possibility of inconsistent results for
similarly situated, injured investors. The Supreme Court denied certiorari
in Mordaunt v. Incomco,86 a case examining the classification of
discretionary commodities futures contracts, with Justice White
dissenting:
The importance of this conflict is not limited to the classification of
discretionary commodities futures contracts. In related areas the lower
courts are similarly divided as to whether Howey requires vertical or
horizontal commonality …. In light of the clear and significant split in
87
the Circuits, I would grant certiorari.

Despite Justice White’s observations in Mordaunt, the Supreme Court
has, to date, declined to take up the issue of what constitutes a common
enterprise, to the disappointment of many.88
83

See id. at 478.
See id. at 478-79.
85
Borsani, supra note 42, at 10-11.
86
469 U.S. 1115 (1985) (cert. denied).
87
Id. at 1116-17 (White, J., dissenting).
88
See Borsani, supra note 42. One commentator highlights the current state of the
84

law:
With essentially three competing theories on the proper method for
analyzing the “common enterprise” it begs the question: what is the
proper method to utilize? But more importantly, it implores the
Supreme Court to take a stance on the issue so that there may be some
uniformity amongst the lower courts.
Id. at 14. He goes on to say:
In a hazy, and often complex area full of many uncertainties within the
various circuits, what is clear is that the Supreme Court needs to take
the initiative and, at the very least, address the confusion. It has been
over sixty years since the Supreme Court first laid out the test for an
investment contract in SEC v. Howey, and since then every court has
struggled with interpreting the “common enterprise” element. It is time
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Third prong: expectation of profits. The third prong of the Howey test
requires that the investment of money into this common enterprise be
undertaken with the expectation of profits.89 The expected return on the
investment must come from earnings of the enterprise, not merely
additional contributions, and this return must be the principle motivation
for the investment.90
Fourth prong: solely from the efforts of others. The fourth prong of the
original Howey test requires that the investment of money into this
common enterprise be undertaken with the expectation of profits solely
from the efforts of others.91 Lower courts have considered whether
“solely” means “only” in their articulation of the Howey test, and some
courts have eased the rigidity of the need to have the profits derived solely
from the efforts of others by including profits that come “primarily,”
“substantially,” or “predominantly” from the efforts of others.92 In the
absence of this movement away from the strict construction of the word
“solely,” investors would be excluded from the protection of the securities
laws with respect to any arrangement that involved even the most minimal
efforts from the investors themselves.93
The Supreme Court itself softened its stance and seemingly endorsed a
more relaxed standard for the derivation of the expectation of profits by
omitting the word “solely” from its explication of the Howey test in United
Housing Foundation v. Forman,94 noting that the “touchstone is the
presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others.”95 There is a split in the circuits about whether to follow
for the current Justices to assume the role that Justice White wanted the
Court to take back in 1985 and the role that was circumvented by the
Court in SEC v. Edwards. There needs to be commonality among the
courts for what will constitute an investment of money in a common
enterprise. Otherwise, courts will be faced with the coming attractions
of even more complex analysis with the same answer: we don't know.
Id. at 17.
89
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
90
Many courts combine the third and fourth components, and thus refer to the test as
a three part test. See, e.g., Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing
SEC v. Rubera, 350 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2003)) (“We distilled Howey’s definition into a
three-part test ….”). This combination makes sense, as the full idea is that the investor
has an expectation of profit and that expectation must come, to a large measure, from the
efforts of someone other than the investor.
91
Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
92
See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1974).
93
Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2003).
94
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
95
Id. at 852.
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this more flexible interpretation implicitly adopted by the Supreme
Court.96
Regardless of whether a court chooses to adopt the more flexible
interpretation, that court, and later, commentators, examine how much
effort the promoter put into the project and how much effort the investor
put in to see if the expectation of profits prong is met. Once a court has
determined how much effort the promoter has put into the project, the next
step is to evaluate such efforts to see “whether the efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”97
Courts availing themselves of the flexibility in Howey’s “expectation
of profits solely from the efforts of another” prong, either by adding in
additional facets to the four prongs, or bright-line tests, have created
inconsistent outcomes; this is also the case with resale of pools of
fractionalized interests in life insurance policies purchased by viatical
settlement companies.98
II. THE VIATICAL SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY
Congress intended the securities laws to have a broad reach,99 and the
courts have complied, honoring Congress’ broad definition of what
constitutes a security. The Supreme Court made clear that:
[T]he reach of the [1933] Act does not stop with the obvious and
commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they
appear to be, are also reached if it be proved as matter of fact that they
were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which
100
established their character in commerce as ‘investment contracts.’
96

According to the Supreme Court:
This test speaks in terms of “profits to come solely from the efforts of
others.” Although the issue is not presented in this case, we note that
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that “the word
‘solely’ should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the
definition of an investment contract, but rather must be construed
realistically, so as to include within the definition those schemes which
involve in substance, if not form, securities.” We express no view,
however, as to the holding of this case.
Forman, 421 U.S. at 851 n.16 (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973)).
97
Glenn Turner, 474 F.2d at 482.
98
See infra Part II.
99
See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933) (referencing “the many types of
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security”).
100
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
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Viatical settlements, arguably one such novel, uncommon, or irregular
device, are a form of asset-backed security under which purchasers,
known as viatical settlement companies, buy the right to receive death
benefits under life insurance policies from policyholders, known as
viators, at some discounted rate that takes into account, among other
factors, the expected life span of the viator.101 Viatical settlements are
admittedly less novel, uncommon, and irregular today than they were in
the late 1980s when they first came into the public eye.102
The typical viatical settlement has two phases: a purchase phase,
where some person or entity purchases the life insurance policy from the
terminally-ill policyholder, and a resale phase, where this new owner
either (1) holds the policy until it matures, (2) sells the policy to someone
else, or (3) pools the policy with other policies and sells fractionalized
interests therein.103
The pooling of income-generating assets and the subsequent sale of
fractionalized interests therein is virtually mainstream these days, and in
most cases, such resales should satisfy the Howey test. Further, the typical
101

For a discussion of the history of the viatical settlement industry, see Miriam R.
Albert, Selling Death Short: The Regulatory and Policy Implications of Viatical
Settlements, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1013 (1998).
The amount paid to the viator for a policy is an estimation of its present
value. This present value is calculated in light of factors such as the
projected life expectancy of the policyholder, the prevailing economic
climate (particularly current interest rates), the face value of the policy,
and the cost of at least two years of future premiums, which, under the
viatical settlement agreement, become the responsibility of the
purchaser, absent a disability waiver of premiums. Also relevant to the
purchase price are such factors as the financial strength of the issuing
life insurance company, the viatical settlement company's cost of
funding the policy acquisition, and any miscellaneous expenses.
Id. at 1020.
102
SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 n.1 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated, 87
F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The viatical settlement industry emerged during the late
1980s as a result of the AIDS crisis and has grown rapidly.”).
103
See Fiona M. Jones, Comment, The Viatical Settlement Industry: The Regulatory
Scheme and Its Implications for the Future of the Industry, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 477, 478-81
(1999). The first option does not trigger securities law issues, and thus will not be
explored here. The SEC implicitly acknowledged this, as noted by the trial court in Life
Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 19. “The Commission readily agrees that a straight viatical
settlement is not a security.” Id. Presumably a “straight viatical settlement” means one in
which the purchaser of the policy holds the policy till maturity and does not resell it. The
D.C. Circuit court further supports this idea when it said “presumably a firm might also
buy insurance policies for its own account or act as an agent, matching a single investor
with a terminally ill insured, without running afoul of the securities laws.” Life Partners,
87 F.3d at 539.
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arrangement for the resale of insurance policies pooled by the viatical
settlement company are arguably offered in such a way as to support their
characterization as investment contracts.104 To be clear, the focus of this
analysis is not the issue of whether viatical settlements should be
characterized as securities; commentators have weighed in on that a
myriad of times in the past fifteen years.105 Nor is the focus herein on how
to harmonize the differing characterizations of investments for similarlysituated viators. Rather, the issue herein is whether the Howey test, with its
inherent and intentional flexibility, continues to further the investor
protection goals of the federal securities laws in light of the disparate
outcomes for such viators, and if not, what approaches can be taken with
respect to the Howey test to further the goal of investor protection.
The viatical industry was largely unregulated in the 1980s and 1990s.
Various interested parties have changed this, at least on the purchase
side.106 The initial purchase of life insurance policies by viatical settlement
firms from AIDS patients and other terminally ill viators was the first area
of regulation in this industry, undertaken in an effort to protect this
vulnerable population from being exploited by unscrupulous and
unlicensed purchasers.107 The purchase side of the viatical settlement
industry is now subject to fairly extensive regulation at the state level,
typically by state insurance departments, in forty-five states. 108 On the
104

The Life Partners district court put it succinctly when it said “[a]t issue is an
unusual investment that rests within the grey area of securities laws.” 898 F. Supp. at 17.
Commentators, including this author, have argued that viatical settlements should be
characterized as securities to provide protections for the vulnerable viators who, in the
absence of the federal securities laws’ required disclosure and remedies, are left to their
own information-gathering and with just common law fraud and any state law remedies.
Miriam R. Albert, The Future of Death Futures: Why Viatical Settlements Must Be
Classified as Securities, 19 PACE L. REV. 345, 349 (1999).
105
Shanah Glick, Are Viatical Settlements Securities Within the Regulatory Control
of the Securities Act of 1933?, 60 U. CHI. L.R. 957, 975 (1993). Glick was the first to
comment in a law journal on the regulation of viatical settlements, concluding that
viatical settlements were categorically not securities. Id. Since then, over 100
commentators have weighed in on the issue.
106
These interested parties include viatical settlement companies and industry groups
who strongly opposed regulating the purchase of policies, like the Viatical Association of
America, the National Association of People with AIDS and AIDS lobbyists who pushed
hard for regulation to protect the vulnerable viators, along with state insurance
departments who banded together to draft model legislation. See infra note 109 and
accompanying text.
107
See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
108
In 1993, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners drafted the
“Viatical Settlements Model Act,” which was adopted by eleven jurisdictions. These laws
typically cover the licensing of viatical settlement companies, disclosure obligations,
confidentiality concerns, and best practices for viatical settlement firms. See infra app. A
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resale side, the SEC has continued its efforts to have these interests
characterized as securities under the federal securities laws, with some
success.109
III. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS AS A VEHICLE TO EVALUATE HOWEY
The purchase and pooling of any assets, like car loans, mortgages, or
life insurance policies, and the resale of fractionalized interests therein,
triggers the critical securities law issue of whether the sale constitutes a
sale of investment contracts, and thus securities, under the Howey test.110
The characterization of any interest as a security has important and farreaching ramifications for both the investor and seller thereof. Ideally, this
characterization should be consistent and supportable under the relevant
law. This has not been the case in the viatical settlement industry, raising
concerns about the continued viability of the Howey test with respect to
viatical settlements, which in turn raises concerns on a broader level with
respect to the status of asset-backed securities in general.
(a list of the jurisdictions that have statutes and/or regulations covering the purchase of
insurance policies from viators).
109
The two federal appellate courts to rule on this issue are the D.C. Circuit and the
Eleventh Circuit. See discussion infra Part III. The D.C. Circuit court offered its thoughts
on why the viatical settlement industry had not been subject to more regulation at the
time of the case:
At the same time that it was issuing these three preliminary injunctions
against LPI, the district court acknowledged that the company provides
“valuable funds [to] AIDS patients in their final illness” and that after
“an apparently exhaustive two-year investigation” the SEC could
produce no evidence or even allegations “that any investor, terminally
ill patient, or insurance company has been defrauded, misled, or is in
any way dissatisfied with an LPI viatical settlement.” The Commission,
however, points out that the securities laws, and in particular the
disclosure requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, are intended to
prevent abuses before they arise. Still, that neither policyholders nor
investors have complained of any abuse may help to explain why the
viatical settlements industry is not more regulated. A number of states
have enacted laws protecting the insureds but, according to the SEC, no
state has undertaken specifically to protect investors in viatical
settlements. (In all states investors are still protected by the common
law of fraud, of course.)
Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 538-39.
110
If the viatical settlement firm sells the policy as a whole, in what is known as a
“brokered” viatical settlement, no securities law issue arises as there is no commonality
of either sort. There is no horizontal commonality because there are no other investors
with interest in the policy and no vertical commonality because there is no reliance on the
promoter’s efforts to generate a profit.
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The characterization of viatical settlements as securities has been
considered by two federal courts of appeal: the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Life Partners (LPI)111 and by the Eleventh Circuit
in Mutual Benefits (MBC).112 Although both the LPI and MBC courts
anchor their decisions onto their particular understanding and
interpretation of the Howey test, both explicitly availing themselves of the
flexibility that Congress created by leaving the term investment contract
undefined,113 the two courts reached opposite conclusions.114 Because the
cases are factually consistent, however, it is not possible to harmonize the
two holdings. Investors are thus left with no clarity or certainty regarding
the treatment of their interests under the federal securities laws, and
viatical settlement companies can have no confidence that they can
conduct their businesses as currently conducted, without potentially
running afoul of the securities laws.115
In LPI and MBC, the SEC charged a large viatical settlement firm116
with violations of the federal securities laws, including the offering and
sale of unregistered securities in violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act.117
In each case, the respective district court agreed with the SEC, and issued
opinions, leading to the imposition of an injunction against the viatical
settlement firms, prohibiting the sale of these securities.118 However, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court in LPI, finding
the viatical settlements at issue not to be securities,119 while the Eleventh
111

87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005).
113
Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 549; Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 742.
114
Compare Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 549 (finding viatical settlements are not
securities under Howey), with Mutual Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 743 (finding viatical
settlements to be securities consistent with Howey).
115
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the similarity in facts when it referred to
“Life Partners, a case involving facts similar to those presented here.” Mut. Benefits
Corp., 408 F.3d at 743 (italics added).
116
At the time of LPI, Life Partners was the largest viatical settlement firm in the
nation. SEC v. Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated, 87 F.3d 536
(D.C. Cir. 1996). Similarly, between 1994 and 2004 more than 29,000 investors
nationwide invested more than $1 billion in viatical settlements offered by the Mutual
Benefits Corp. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 738.
117
The SEC charged Mutual Benefits Corp. with: sale of unregistered securities in
violation of sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act, fraud in violation of section
17(a)(l) of the Securities Act, fraud in violation of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5, thereunder. See Complaint at 18-19, SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F.
Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (No. 04-60573), 2004 WL 2876016.
118
See Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated, 87 F.3d 536 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); see also Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d,
408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005).
119
Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 549.
112
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Circuit affirmed the district court in MBC, finding that the viatical
settlements were securities;120 both cases relied on the same law and
applied that law to essentially the same facts.
A side-by-side examination of each court’s analysis of the Howey test
demonstrates the inconsistencies in the courts’ respective articulations,
and, more importantly, the inconsistencies in their respective applications
of the language of the Howey test. Although this examination supports the
conclusion that the decision in MBC is sound as a matter of law and policy
while the decision in LPI is not, or vise versa, the analysis of these cases is
a means to an end. These conflicting decisions prompt an evaluation of the
continued viability of the Howey test as the touchstone for determining the
characterization of an interest as an investment contract, ultimately
questioning whether the Howey test is furthering the goals of the federal
securities laws.
Both the LPI and MBC courts acknowledged Howey’s precedent as
binding, but each court articulated the test slightly differently. The
Eleventh Circuit articulated the Howey test as follows: (1) an investment
of money; (2) in a common enterprise; and (3) the expectation of profits
derived solely from the efforts of others.121 The D.C. Circuit articulated
the Howey test as follows: “an investment contract is a security subject to
the [1933] Act if investors purchase [the interest] with (1) an expectation
of profits arising from (2) a common enterprise that (3) depends upon the
efforts of others.”122 These differing expressions of the Howey test are
noteworthy only to support the conclusion that the courts take latitude in
articulating the precedents under which they are bound; however, the
differences in articulation themselves have no substantive effect in these
viatical settlement cases. What has a substantive effect in these cases,
however, is the differing interpretation of the same precedent by the two
courts, which is problematic and results in two entirely opposite
characterizations of the same interests under the same test. This raises
concerns not only in the context of the viatical settlement industry, as the
two decisions are binding precedents in their respective jurisdictions, but
also for the issuers and purchasers of other forms of asset-backed
securities who may face a judge inspired to apply the LPI holding to other
forms of asset-backed investments.
Investment of money. Both the LPI and MBC courts acknowledged,
either tacitly or expressly, that the investors in the viatical settlements at
issue met the investment of money requirement of Howey.123
120

Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 745.
Id. at 742-43.
122
Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 542.
123
The MBC trial court tacitly acknowledged that the investment of money criteria is
121

26

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:001

Commonality. Both the LPI and MBC courts concluded that investors
in the viatical settlements at issue met the appropriate version of
commonality.124 The D.C. Circuit has adopted horizontal commonality as
the standard for a common enterprise under Howey, noting that “it is the
inter-dependency of the investors that transforms the transaction
substantively into a pooled investment.”125 The court found the pooling of
investment funds, shared profits, and shared losses present in the viatical
settlements at issue, and as a result, found horizontal commonality.126
satisfied when it noted that the defendants were seeking to dismiss the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because “viatical settlements fail to meet the second and third
elements of the test set forth in Howey.” Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
The Eleventh Circuit expressly acknowledged that the investment of money criteria is
met when it says that there “is no genuine dispute here that there was (1) an investment of
money.” Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 742. The LPI trial court did not discuss the
investment of money criteria, which is consistent with its articulation of the Howey test:
“An investment contract is ‘a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests
his money [1] in a common enterprise and [2] is led to expect profits [3] solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party.’” Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 19 (quoting SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946)). The court began its analysis with its
first prong, focusing on whether a common enterprise is present, thereby tacitly
acknowledging that the requisite investment of money has occurred. Id. at 19.
124
Both trial courts concluded that their respective viatical settlements satisfy
commonality. The LPI trial court found both forms of commonality:
Horizontal commonality exists through LPI’s sale of fractional interests
in the death benefit due under a single policy. The fortunes of each
investor are tied to that of the other investors in that policy, with
proceeds to be divided on a pro rata basis …. Both types of vertical
commonality are also present in this case. The investors' fortunes are
tied to those of the promoter since LPI takes title to the policies. From
the perspective of both the insurance company and the insured, LPI is
the new owner and beneficiary of the life insurance policies. Investors
are dependent upon LPI to protect their interests, and their interests
would be greatly affected by LPI's dissolution or insolvency. Such risks
are sufficient to meet the test for vertical commonality.
Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 20. The MBC trial court only found vertical
commonality. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
125
Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 544.
126
According to the court:
It seems to us that the pooling issue reduces to the question whether
there is a threshold percentage of a policy that must be sold before an
investor can be assured that his purchase of a smaller percentage
interest will be consummated. If not, then each investor's acquisition is
independent of all the other investors’ acquisitions and LPI is correct in
asserting that there is no pooling. On the other hand, if LPI must have
investors ready to buy some minimum percentage of the policy before
the transaction will occur, then the investment is contingent upon a
pooling of capital.
Id.
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These characteristics were present because the viatical settlements
involved multiple investors who aggregated their invested funds into the
purchase of interests in one or more policies, so no one investor could
purchase a single policy alone. Further, as a result of the structure, no
investor in any policy could realize a gain or loss without the identical,
albeit proportional, effect on the remaining investors in that same
policy.127
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted vertical commonality as its standard
for a common enterprise under Howey, which requires only “the success
of the investors to be dependent on the success of the investment
promoters' efforts to secure a return.”128 Here, the investors' return was
“highly dependent” on the promoters’ efforts, which included efforts by
MBC to locate policies, negotiate the purchase price, and bid on policies.
MBC recruited doctors to evaluate the health of potential viators and
produce a life expectancy valuation on the viators, and created the legal
documents necessary to conclude the transactions.129 MBC marketed its
expertise in these areas to potential investors.130 As a result, the district
court found that the viatical settlements in MBC satisfied the commonality
requirement of Howey, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this
conclusion.131
Expectation of profit. Both the LPI and MBC courts concluded that the
investors had the requisite expectation of profits from their investments.
The LPI district court held that the investors’ returns under the viatical
settlements “qualifie[d] as profit under Howey.”132 The D.C. Circuit court
was not so quick to make that determination, looking into whether
127

Id. at 543.
Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
129
Id. at 1338.
130
Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737 at 739. The court found:
MBC touted to potential investors its expertise in evaluating life
expectancy, and thus its ability to make the venture successful. Id.
Robert Roberts, a former in-house sales director at MBC, testified that
investors were told about MBC's expertise in selecting policies and the
track record it claimed in predicting life expectancy…. Roberts was
instructed to inform inquiring investors that MBC correctly estimated
life expectancy 80% of the time.
128

Id.

131

Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 743 n.4. The Eleventh Circuit notes that Mutual
Benefits Corp. made what it characterized as a “passing objection” to the district court’s
conclusion that the investments in viatical settlements satisfied the common enterprise
prong of Howey, but the court found that argument meritless, finding that these interests
satisfy both horizontal and vertical commonality. Id.
132
SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 21 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated, 87 F.3d
536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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investors in the LPI viatical settlements had the requisite expectation of
profit.133 The D.C. Circuit court ultimately found that investors received
an asset in the form of a claim on future death benefits of the viator, which
was not able to be “currently consumed” but instead was purchased for the
prospect of return on the investment.134 Thus, the D.C. Circuit determined
that the sale of fractionalized interests in these viatical settlements
satisfied the “expectation of profit” requirement from Howey. The
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the investors in the MBC viatical
settlements had an expectation of profit, noting there was “no genuine
dispute” as to the satisfaction of this portion of the Howey test.135
Solely from the efforts of others. As noted above, both the LPI and
MBC courts concluded that the investors in the viatical settlements at issue
invested money in a common enterprise with an expectation of profits.136
The two courts differed, however, in their interpretation of what the
“expectation of profits” prong requires, and their application of their own
differing interpretation to essentially the same investments.
A necessary first step for both the LPI and MBC courts was to
catalogue the efforts of the promoters, in order to then evaluate whether
such efforts were “undeniably significant,” “essential,” and
“managerial.”137 Both viatical settlement companies located the policies,
negotiated the purchase price with the viators, drafted the relevant legal
documentation necessary to complete the purchase of each policy, and
retained doctors to evaluate the life expectancy of the viators.138 Both
firms undertook to pay the post-closing premiums necessary to keep the
policies in good standing, either from operating funds or from the
investors’ funds, if the purchase agreement so provided.139
After cataloging the efforts of the promoters, both courts measured
them against the requirements of the Howey test. Both the D.C. Circuit
and the Eleventh Circuit have adopted the more relaxed reading of “solely
from the efforts of others,” looking for those efforts that are “undeniably
significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure
or success of the enterprise.”140 How the two courts interpret this relaxed
standard, however, is quite different.
133

Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d at 542-43.
Id. at 543.
135
Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 742-43.
136
See supra notes 123-134 and accompanying text.
137
SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d,
408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d
1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999)).
138
Id. at 1338; Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539.
139
Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d at 740; Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 540.
140
Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1342, aff’d, 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005)
134
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Both viatical settlement companies asked that the courts draw a
distinction between the promoter’s activity before the resale of
fractionalized interests to the investor and that same activity after such
sale, for purposes of this prong of Howey. Their argument was that the
promoter’s efforts before the resale of the policy to the investor somehow
falls outside the scope of the Howey test, as if the Howey test required that
the investor’s expectation of profits derived solely from efforts of the
promoter after the investor had invested money in to the common
enterprise.141 This concept is not present in the verbiage or interpretation
of the original Howey test, and in fact is not present in any other judicial
decision interpreting Howey other than the LPI opinion.
The LPI court had an opportunity to further the goals of the federal
securities laws, but instead chose to judicially validate the non-existent
nuances in the Howey test proposed by Life Partners as a basis to find that
the viatical settlements in question were not investment contracts, thereby
denying the protection of the federal securities laws to the investors
therein.142 Perhaps in an effort to rein in the flexibility of the Howey test,
the D.C. Circuit created a bright-line test tied to the time of sale, so that
the same undeniably significant and essential managerial efforts that occur
before the investor buys the policy do not satisfy Howey. Yet if these same
efforts occurred post-closing, they would somehow then satisfy Howey.143
This artificial test is neither required by nor supportable under Howey. It is
inconsistent with the goals of the federal securities laws, and is based on a
misconception or misunderstanding about the nature of this form of assetbacked security.144 As the Eleventh Circuit stated, “[b]right-line rules are
discouraged in the context of federal securities laws for the reason that
they tend to create loopholes that can be used by the clever and
dishonest.”145 Indeed, the bright-line rule enunciated in LPI created a
(quoting SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999)). The
court’s standard in LPI is also relaxed from “soley” looking instead for “profits derived
prominently from the efforts of others.” Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545.
141
Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545.
142
Id. at 548.
143
See id. at 551.
144
It is worth noting that the SEC commented:
[E]ven if the Court were to adopt the bright-line rule of Life Partners,
MBC’s significant entrepreneurial and managerial post-purchase
activities would still satisfy the third prong of Howey. Defendants
dispute the contention. Because the Court declines to follow Life
Partners, the Court need not reach the issue of timing.
Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1343 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d, 408
F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005). Other courts have declined to follow LPI. See, e.g.,
Wuliger v. Christie, 310 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
145
Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
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loophole, which became the defendants' corporate structure model in
MBC. Anthony Livoti, trustee for Mutual Benefits, testified in his
deposition that the “attorneys of Mutual Benefits were cognizant of the
SEC vs. Life Partners case.”146 Indeed, counsel for Mutual Benefits
testified at the evidentiary hearing that Mutual Benefits attempted to
restructure certain portions of their operations to conform to the D.C.
Circuit's ruling in LPI.147
The Eleventh Circuit declined to make the distinctions that the D.C.
Circuit did, and refused to differentiate pre and post-sale efforts for
purposes of characterizing the underlying instruments.148 The “key
question” according to the court was “whether profits are derived from the
activities of the promoter or rather, the operation of external market forces
beyond the control of the promoter.”149 This distinction makes sense in
light of the underlying goals of the securities law: disclosure will only
offer protection in investments that depend on the promoters, and will
have no effect on investments that depend on the operation of market
forces external to those promoters.150 With that standard in place, the court
was not persuaded by Mutual Benefits’s contention that the profits of the
viatical settlements are determined by the purely external force of the
actual date of death of the viator.151 While the date of death is certainly an
important factor in the profitability of a viatical settlement, the underlying
pricing is more critical; the viatical settlement company’s efforts, prepurchase, in locating and negotiating the terms of purchase (and inherent
therein in calculating a probable life expectancy for the viator), will have a
significant, if not dispositive effect on the profitability of the viatical
settlement.152 The investors’ initial dependence on the viatical settlement
company’s expertise also continues after the investment. The MBC court
noted that neither offerees nor purchasers of the fractionalized interests
had access to the insureds’ medical files, and so could not hire experts to
engage in life expectancy evaluations.153 The investors had to rely on the

146

Id. (italics added).
Id.
148
Id. at 1343 n.8. The SEC disputed the validity of the new bright-line test, but in an
effort to cover all bases, advanced the position that even if the court were to somehow
adopt the Life Partners test, MBC’s “significant entrepreneurial and managerial postpurchase activities would still satisfy the third prong of Howey.” Id. Because the MBC
court declined to follow Life Partners, it refused to evaluate the SEC’s argument. Id.
149
Id. at 1342.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 739 (11th Cir. 2005).
147
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viatical settlement company for this critical pre-purchase function154 to
monitor and protect their investment. In the absence of required
disclosures under the federal securities laws, this reliance may be to their
detriment.
In an odd wrinkle that came out during the MBC trial, it turns out that
Mutual Benefits, among its other acts of fraud, typically had the life
expectancy evaluations done after the closing.155 This highlights the
reliance that investors have on Mutual Benefits’s efforts, as they have no
access to the necessary medical information to undertake a life expectancy
calculation on their own. Ironically, because of this fraud, more of Mutual
Benefits’s efforts were actually made post-purchase, although one doubts
if that is what the D.C. Circuit had in mind when crafting their bright-line
test.156
IV. LEGISLATING AROUND THE HOWEY TEST
In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court on issues like
horizontal versus vertical commonality, or on pre-purchase versus postpurchase promoter efforts for satisfying Howey, investors are denied
certainty about the characterization of new and innovative investments as
securities, including viatical settlements. Arguably as a result of the
Supreme Court’s silence on the lower courts’ interpretations of the Howey
test, other avenues of investor protection have been opening up in the form
of model laws, amended statutes, and judicial opinions.

154

Id.
Id. at 740
156
According to the court:
There is evidence in the record that MBC, in fact, routinely did not
receive life-expectancy evaluations until after closing. Melanie
Goldberg was the person at MBC responsible for preparing the postclosing information to be sent to investors. She explained that she
worked from a spreadsheet listing recently “closed” policies. This
“closed” list provided the insureds' names, their life expectancies, and
the closing dates. Goldberg routinely received medical records after a
closing and sent them to one of the doctors used by MBC. Later, she
got the medical reports back from the doctors and sent them to
investors. When drafting reports for doctors to sign, Goldberg testified
that she (in accordance with MBC policy) entered the date MBC
acquired a particular policy as the date of the medical report. Doctors'
reports were always pre-dated, she explained, because “it had to look
like it was being reviewed at the time the viator was selling the
policy ... that it had to show that it was reviewed at the time the file was
sold, not afterwards.”
Id. at 739 (internal citations omitted).
155
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First, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws updated the Uniform Securities Act, included the following as part
of its definition of security in section 102(28)(D) of the revised act:
[A]n investment in a common enterprise with the expectation of profits
to be derived primarily from the efforts of a person other than the
investor and a “common enterprise” means an enterprise in which the
fortunes of the investor are interwoven with those of either the person
157
offering the investment, a third party, or other investors.

This first part of the definition is derived from the Howey test, and
essentially codifies the most liberal version of the test; this definition
adopts the looser approach to “solely from the efforts of others” and
specifically authorizes both horizontal and vertical commonality, offering
an inclusive reading of the test that will cover interests that would satisfy
the definition of investment contract across all circuits. The definition
excludes any mention of pre- or post-purchase efforts bright-line, and so
arguably includes viatical settlements like those at issue in LPI within the
definition of security.
The Uniform Act language offers clarity on the characterization of all
interests as investment contracts, allowing states that adopt this language
to offer much more certainty to investors in their jurisdiction on the
characterization of a particular investment interest, including viatical
settlements. That said, the treatment of viatical settlements by the LPI
court was a factor for the drafters of the Uniform Act in constructing this
definition. As the prefatory notes to the 2002 version of the Uniform Act
provide, the definition of security was modernized, among other goals, to
“amplify the definition of investment contract so that it can expressly
reach interests in … viatical settlement agreements, among other
contracts, when they satisfy the definition of investment contract.”158 Thus
the drafters included in their definition of security in section 102(28)(E)
that the term investment contract includes an interest in “a viatical
settlement or similar agreement.”159
States have begun to legislate around the uncertainty stemming from
the flexibility of Howey by essentially codifying a clear explication of the
components of the Howey test, with some states using the language in the
Uniform Securities Act. To date, seventeen states have included in their
statutory definition of security, language that codifies some or all of the
concepts of the Howey test, in essence, crafting state law tests for
157

UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102(28)(D) (amended 2002), 7C U.L.A. 29 (2006).
UNIF. SEC. ACT General Notes (amended 2002).
159
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102(28)(E) (amended 2002), 7C U.L.A. 29 (2006).
158
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identifying an investment contract.160 This approach may eliminate some
of the uncertainty presently surrounding the application of the Howey test
to innovative and unusual investment vehicles, dependent, of course, on
how the states articulate and apply these tests.
Some states have gone further in the context of viatical settlements
through judicial decisions and legislation. These states can distance
themselves from the bright-line test in LPI for purposes of evaluating the
characterization of a particular interest under their own state law, and at
the same time, further the underlying purposes of their securities laws,
which are typically analogous to those underlying the federal securities
laws. To date, ten state courts have ruled that viatical settlements are
securities.161 These courts focused on the remedial goals of their state
securities laws,162 and the persuasive, non-binding nature of federal court
160

Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin include viatical settlements within their definition of security.
See infra app. B.
161
See Siporin v. Carrington, 23 P.3d 92, 98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); In People ex rel.
Wood v. Innovative Fin. Services, No. D045555, 2006 WL 392030, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 17, 2006), the California courts were
not persuaded by the analysis of the court in Life Partners, which in
finding the viatical settlement contracts were not investment contracts,
made a distinction between an investment promoter's activities prior to
his having use of an investor's money and his activities after he has use
of the money. Like other federal courts, “we are not convinced that
[Howey] require[s] such a clean distinction.”
Id. at *6 (quoting Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737 (citation omitted)); see also
Joseph v. Viatica Mgmt., LLC, 55 P.3d 264 (Colo. App. 2002); Kligfeld v.
Office of Fin. Regulation, 876 So. 2d 36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 2004); Allen v. Jones,
604 S.E.2d 644 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Accelerated Benefits Corp. v. Peaslee, 818
N.E.2d 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Sec. Trust Corp. v. Estate of Fisher, 797 N.E.2d
789 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Poyser v. Flora, 780 N.E.2d 1191 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003); Hill v. Dedicated Res., Inc., No. 99-C-1714, 2000 WL 34001915 (Kan.
Ct. App. July 12, 2000); Lubin v. Benefit Assurance, Ltd., No. 24-C-02-006515,
2006 WL 5781983 (Md. Nov. 19, 2002); Michelson v. Voison, 658 N.W.2d 188
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003); Schwalm v. Penn. Sec. Comm’n, 965 A.2d 326 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2009); Stellar v. Penn. Sec. Comm’n, 877 A.2d 518 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2005). The only court, other than the D.C. Circuit, to hold viatical
settlements do not constitute securities is Griffitts v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 1001-00271-CV, 2004 WL 1178418 (Tex. App. May 26, 2004).
162
For example, the Colorado court noted:
Moreover, we conclude defendants [sic] position is inconsistent with
the policies embraced by Colorado's own General Assembly. See § 1151-101(3), C.R.S. 2001 (provisions and rules under the Act shall be
coordinated with federal acts and statutes to the extent consistent with
the purposes of the Act) .… One purpose of the Act is to protect
investors. The Act is remedial in nature and is to be broadly construed
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decisions on state courts interpreting state laws, in holding that the viatical
settlements at issue were, in fact, securities.163
The Court of Appeals of Arizona, for example, considered the
characterization of viatical settlements in Siporin v. Carrington,164 holding
that the viatical settlement agreements at issue were securities for purposes
of the Arizona Securities Act.165 In so holding, the court focused on
remedial goals of the Arizona Securities Act.166 The court noted that the
Arizona definition of security was virtually identical to that of the 1933
and 1934 Acts, and further noted that in interpreting the otherwise
undefined term investment contract, it would look to the federal courts for
guidance.167 At the time of the decision, the only federal court to opine on
the issue was the D.C. Circuit’s LPI decision. The Arizona court declined
to follow the bright-line test therein, to avoid “taking a position
inconsistent with the policies embraced by our own legislature,” one that
would “not advance the Arizona policy of protecting the public from
unscrupulous investment promoters” like the LPI decision.168 The court
had harsh words for the bright-line test, finding no more than “tangential
support”169 for it in Howey or any other federal decisions; the court found
to effectuate its purposes. See § 11-51-101(2), C.R.S. 2001; Sauer v.
Hays, 36 Colo. App. 190, 539 P.2d 1343 (1975). In light of the
prophylactic and remedial purposes of the Act, and our duty to interpret
it broadly, we conclude that Life Partners is clearly distinguishable,
and we are not persuaded by either the rationale or conclusions reached
in that case.
Viatica Mgmt., 55 P.3d at 267.
163
According to the Fourth Appellate District of the Court of Appeal of California,
“[A]lthough the California Corporate Securities Law was patterned after the federal
Securities Act of 1933, the federal cases interpreting the federal law offer persuasive
rather than controlling authority in construing state law." People ex rel. Wood, 2006 WL
392030, at *6 (citation omitted).
164
23 P.3d 92.
165
Id. at 98.
166
Id. at 95 (quoting 1951 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 18, § 20). The court stated:
The intent and purpose of this Act is for the protection of the public, the
preservation of fair and equitable business practices, the suppression of
fraudulent or deceptive practices in the sale or purchase of securities,
and the prosecution of persons engaged in fraudulent or deceptive
practices in the sale or purchase of securities. This Act shall not be
given a narrow or restricted interpretation or construction, but shall be
liberally construed as a remedial measure in order not to defeat the
purpose thereof.
Id. at 95.
167
Id. at 96.
168
Id. at 98.
169
Id.
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the bright-line test to be a “convenient but inflexible and formalistic
approach to the application of the 1933 and 1934 federal Securities
Acts”170 that does not serve “the prophylactic and remedial purposes of the
Arizona Securities Act.”171 The Arizona legislature apparently agreed and
amended the securities laws in 2000 to specifically include viatical
settlements within the definition of security.172
Like Arizona, thirty-three other states have amended their securities
laws to include viatical settlements in their definition of security, offering
the investors therein added protection under the state securities laws.173
These statutes describe viatical settlements in different ways, consistent
with the Uniform Act’s inclusion on its list of securities “viatical
settlement or similar agreement.”174 The official comments to the Uniform
Act state that
[t]his Act also refers to an investment in a viatical settlement or a
similar agreement to make unequivocally clear that viatical settlement
[sic] and similar agreements, which otherwise satisfy the definition of
an investment contract, are securities. This is intended to reject the
holding of one court that a viatical contract could not be a security.

These comments are followed by a citation to the D.C. Circuit
Court opinion in LPI.175
The amended statutes did not put an immediate end to the litigation
about the status of viatical settlements as securities. In the states that have
specifically included viatical settlements in the laundry list definition of
“securities,” litigation has arisen over interests that were purchased or sold
prior to the inclusion of viatical settlements in the statute.176 The
170

Id. at 99.
Id.
172
Id.
173
See infra app. B (for a list of the states that include viatical or life settlements in
their definition of security).
174
See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102(28)(E) (amended 2002); 7C U.L.A. 28 (2006).
175
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102 cmts. (amended 2005); 7C U.L.A. 28 (2006) (quoting Joel
Seligman, The New Uniform Securities Act, 81 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 243, 250 (2003)).
176
To date, fifteen states have amended their statutory definition of security to
include viatical settlements. See infra App. B. Defendants in these states made creative
arguments that the legislature’s amendment of the statute to specifically include viatical
settlements within the definition of security somehow shows that viatical settlements did
not previously come within the definition of the statute. The courts have not been
persuaded by that argument, arguably because viatical settlements satisfy the Howey test
and should be considered securities even in the absence of statutory authority. In Georgia,
the court held that “before July 1, 2002, a viatical contract could qualify as a security
under Georgia law. Accordingly, we reject the trial court's ruling that Jones was entitled
to summary judgment because the Allens and Adams could not prove the predicate RICO
171
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defendants in these cases argue that because the definition at the time of
the transaction did not include viatical settlements, they had not violated
the state securities laws by selling unregistered securities, as the viatical
settlements were not then considered securities. All but one of the courts
to consider these cases have held that, although the statutory definition
was not in place at the time of the transaction, an application of the Howey
test demonstrated that the interests in question were nonetheless securities
under Howey, even before the change in statutory language.177
act of selling unregistered securities by an unregistered agent.” Allen v. Jones, 604 S.E.2d
644, 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). See also Accelerated Benefits Corp. v. Peaslee, 818 N.E.2d
73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Poyser v. Flora, 780 N.E.2d 1191, 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003);
Security Trust Corp. v. Estate of Fisher ex rel. Roy, 797 N.E.2d 789, 797 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003), trans. denied, 812 N.E.2d 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
177
But see Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (illustrating that
interests specifically set out in the definition do not have to, and in most cases, will not,
satisfy Howey). In People ex rel. Wood v. Innovative Fin. Services, No. D045555, 2006
WL 392030, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2006), the court noted that California had
regarded viatical settlements as securities even prior to the amendment of the statute, and
concluded that the amendment was intended only to clarify existing law. In Glick v.
Sokol, 777 N.E.2d 315, the court declined to include viatical settlement investments
purchased prior to the amendment of the statute to include viatical settlements as
securities under Ohio law:
Under current Ohio law, viatical settlements are securities subject to
registration. By Am.Sub.H.B. No. 551, enacted after the transaction at
issue in this case, the Ohio legislature amended the Ohio Revised Code
"to make life settlement interests subject to the Ohio Securities Law."
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 551, Preamble. Accordingly, as of October 5, 2001,
the statutory definition of "security" expressly includes "any life
settlement interest." R.C. 1707.01(B).
Id. at 317. The court applies the Ohio case law test for the existence of a security from
State v. George, 50 Ohio App. 2d 297 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975), and finds that the viatical
settlements did not satisfy the test. Glick, 777 N.E.2d at 319 (“We conclude that a viatical
settlement promoter’s efforts to perform the services it promised does not constitute the
risks of the enterprise under George.”). This is especially surprising in light of the Ohio
Division of Securities’ pronouncement prior to the opinion. According to the Glick court,
“the division issued a pronouncement in which it concluded that in virtually all instances
viatical settlements are securities subject to the regulatory framework of the Ohio
Securities Act.” Id. at 319. The court declined to follow the Ohio Division of Securities’
interpretation of what constituted a security:
Although we afford due deference to interpretations by administrative
agencies with substantive expertise, we decline to follow the Division's
determination that Glick's viatical settlements were securities under the
Ohio Securities Act prior to the effective date of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 551.
We disagree with the Division's conclusion that viatical settlements are
securities under the George test .… Our conclusion that the viatical
settlements at issue were not securities is further bolstered by the
legislature's clear intent for prospective application of Am.Sub.H.B.
No. 551. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 551 specifically provides that the addition
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court provided a rationale to support the statutory and
jurisprudential policy of flexibility in the context of determining the
coverage of the federal securities laws, finding that “[s]uch an approach
has the corresponding advantage, though, of permitting the SEC and the
courts sufficient flexibility to ensure that those who market investments
are not able to escape the coverage of the Securities Acts by creating new
instruments that would not be covered by a more determinate
definition.”178 Flexibility in law is a valuable goal and powerful tool; but
when taken to extremes, it can give the courts too much room to
maneuver, and has the potential to undermine the purpose of the law at
issue. In the case of the definition of investment contract, the cost of the
flexibility built into the Howey test is the protection of at least one group
of investors who seek judicial relief in a court bound to follow the D.C.
Circuit’s bright-line test in LPI.
With the current flexible definition of investment contract, a court can
flesh out the definition to fit its view of a particular instrument, and courts
in other jurisdictions not bound by this determination can flesh out the
definition of the same interest in a different way. The cost of maintaining
this flexible definition of investment contract is the potential for a very
real difference in the kinds of protections offered to investors depending
on where they buy the interests in question. Query whether this level of
flexibility is what the Supreme Court had in mind when rendering the
Howey opinion. That house in the neighborhood with all the additions
built on is in danger of falling down around itself if these additions
increase in weight.
of "life settlement interests" to the list of express securities under R.C.
1707.01(B) "shall take effect six months after the effective date of this
act." Am.Sub.H.B. No. 551, Section 3. The legislature further provided
that "[a]ny person that, on the effective date of this act, transacts
business in this state as a viatical settlement provider, viatical
settlement representative, or viatical settlement broker may continue to
do so pending approval of the person's application for a license, if the
person applies for the license during the six-month period immediately
following the effective date of this act." Am.Sub.H.B. No. 551, Section
4. The Division's determination that Glick's investments were securities
under the George test flies in the face of the legislative intent for
prospective addition of viatical settlements to the list of securities under
R.C. 1707.01.
Id. at 319-20. But a year later, the same court found the viatical settlements in question to
be securities. Rumbaugh v. Ohio Dep’t of Commerce, 800 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio Ct. App.
2003).
178
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990).
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That said, the benefits of the flexibility of the Howey test arguably
outweigh the costs in terms of inconsistent results for similar investments,
as states have begun offering additional protections to investors within
their borders through legislation and judicial rulings on the status of
viatical settlements. And the Supreme Court does not seem interested in
revisiting Howey, despite the “clear and significant” split in the courts on
the issue of commonality179 and the LPI bright-line test.
Certainly one rogue court crafting a bright-line test in LPI does not
constitute a clear and significant split, but LPI is still good law in the D.C.
Circuit, and is binding precedent for the characterization of viatical
settlements in that jurisdiction.180 Potentially more problematic, LPI and
its bright-line test are available for all the courts in that circuit to apply to
any other interests that the courts believe are factually similar to the LPI
facts. With the increasing numbers and types of innovative investment
vehicles, including new forms of asset-backed and receivable financing,
this is a real concern that should continue to be handled at the state level
through appropriate legislation and judicial guidance.
When and if the Supreme Court revisits Howey, it should comment on
the component parts of the test, specifically adopting horizontal or vertical
commonality, or, like the Uniform Act, both. At a minimum, the Court
should also overrule the pre versus post purchase bright-line test from the
D.C. Circuit. This would provide clarity for all the participants, both
sellers and investors, in the “countless and variable schemes devised by
those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits.”181 This would have the added benefit of bringing increased
investor protection in the viatical settlement industry to supplement
protections offered at the state level. This could be accomplished without
the Court even classifying fractional interests in viatical settlements as
securities for purposes of the securities laws. Just these modifications to
Howey would bring the resale of the fractionalized interests under the
protection of the securities laws, complete with antifraud and disclosure
obligations, and civil remedies. This would lend consistency to the viatical
settlement markets, but more importantly, to the world of innovative and
creative investment interests as a whole.
In the absence of such clarity from the Supreme Court, states will continue
to try to bridge the uncertainty, and through legislation and court decisions, get
clarity for their investors. We can only hope that they craft their decisions with
more precision and consistency than the D.C. Circuit did in LPI.
179

Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1117 (1985), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1115
(1985) .
180
See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
181
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
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APPENDIX A: VIATICAL REGULATIONS
The following jurisdictions have statutes and/or regulations covering
the purchase of insurance policies from viators:
Alaska:
• Statutes: ALASKA STAT. § 21.96.10 (2010) (viatical
settlement transactions); ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.155 (2010)
(viatical settlement interests).
• Regulations: ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 31.300-449
(2010).
Arizona:
• Statutes: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1850 (LexisNexis 2010)
(viatical or life settlement investment contracts).
• No regulations.
Arkansas:
• Statutes: ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-81-801 to -818 (2010)
(Life Settlements Act).
• Regulations: 54-00 ARK. CODE R. § 69 (Lexis Nexis 2010)
(viatical settlements).
California:
• Statutes: CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10113.1-10113.2 (West 2005)
(life and disability insurance, viatical settlement); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10209.3 (West 2005) (group life policies, assignment of
incidents of ownership, viatical settlements); CAL. CORP. CODE §
25508.5 (West 2006) (rescission or cancellation of viatical or life
settlement contracts).
• Regulations: CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 2548.1-2548.31
(2010) (viatical settlements).
Colorado:
• Statutes: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-7-601 to -620 (2010)
(viatical settlements).
• Regulations: 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 702-2 (2009) (viatical
settlements).
Connecticut:
• Statutes: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-465 to -465q (2010)
(life settlements).
• Regulations: CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 38a-465-1 to -10
(2000) (viatical settlements).
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Delaware:
• Statutes: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7501-7510 (2010)
(viatical settlements).
• No regulations.
Florida:
• Statutes: FLA. STAT. §§ 626.991 to 626.99295 (LexisNexis
2010) (viatical settlements).
• Regulations: FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 69O-204.010 to
.201 (2009) (viatical settlements).
Georgia:
• Statutes: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-59-1 to -18 (2010) (life
settlements).
• Regulations: GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-93-.01 to -.10
(2010) (life settlements).
Hawaii:
• Statutes: HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 431E-1 to -53
(repealed 2010) (life settlements).
• No regulations.
Idaho:
• Statutes: IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 41-1950 to -1965 (2010)
(life settlements).
• No regulations.
Illinois:
• Statutes: 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 159/1 to 159/999
(West 2010) (viatical settlements).
• Regulations: ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 5701.10 to .100
(2010) (viatical settlements).
Indiana:
• Statutes: IND. CODE §§ 27-8-19.8-1 to -26 (LexisNexis
2010) (living benefits arrangement).
• Regulations: 760 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-61-1 to -12 (2010)
(viatical settlements).
Iowa:
• Statutes: IOWA CODE §§ 508E.1 to .20 (West 2009)
(viatical settlement contracts).
• Regulations: IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-48.1 to .14 (2009)
(viatical and life settlements).
Kansas:
• Statutes: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-5001 to -5016 (2009)
(viatical settlements).
• No regulations
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Kentucky:
• Statutes: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.15-700 to -725
(Lexis Nexis 2010) (viatical settlements).
• Regulations: 806 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 9:310 to :320 (2010)
(Viatical Settlement Broker License and Notification; Viatical
Settlement Provider License); 806 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 15:050
(2010) (reporting and general requirements for Viatical Settlement
Providers and Brokers).
Louisiana:
• Statutes: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:1791 to :1805 (2010)
(viatical settlements).
• Regulations: LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37, §§ 3901-19 (2010)
(viatical settlements).
Maine:
• Statutes: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 6801-6819
(2010) (viatical and life settlements); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 16511 (2010) (right to rescission applicable to sales of viatical or
life settlement contracts).
• Regulations: 02-031-931 ME. CODE R. § 1-12 (Weil 2010)
(viatical and life settlements); 02-032-539 ME. CODE R. § 1-6
(Weil 2010) (offers and sales of viatical or life settlement
contracts).
Maryland:
• Statutes: MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 8-601 to -611
(LexisNexis 2010), (Viatical Settlement Providers and Viatical
Settlement Brokers); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-403 (LexisNexis
2010) (fraudulent insurance acts, failure to return premiums, false
or misleading claims); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-802 (LexisNexis
2010) (reporting suspected insurance fraud); MD. CODE ANN., INS.
§ 27-804 (LexisNexis 2010) (antifraud plans for viatical settlement
providers).
• Regulations: MD. CODE REGS. 31.09.11.00 to .02 (2010)
(viatical settlements).
Massachusetts:
• Statutes: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, §§ 212-23
(LexisNexis 2010) (viatical settlements).
• Regulations: 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.01 to .08 (2010)
(viatical settlements and viatical loans).
Michigan:
• Statutes: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 550.521-.528 (West
2010) (viatical settlement contracts).
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• No regulations.
Minnesota:
• Statutes: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60A.961-.974 (West 2010)
(viatical settlements).
• No regulations.
Mississippi:
• Statutes: MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 83-7-201 to -223 (West 2010)
(viatical settlements).
• Regulations: 28-000-074 MISS. CODE R. § 2000-1 (Weil
2010) (viatical settlements regulation).
Montana:
• Statutes: MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-20-1301 to -1317 (2010)
(Viatical Settlement Act).
• Regulations: MONT. ADMIN. R. 6.6.8501 to -8512 (2010)
(Viatical Settlement Agreement).
Nebraska:
• Statutes: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1101 to -1117
(LexisNexis 2010) (viatical settlements).
• Regulations: 210 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 76-001 (2010)
(viatical settlements).
Nevada:
• Statutes: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 688C.010 to -.510
(West 2010) (viatical settlements).
• Regulations: NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 688C.010 to -.240
(2010) (viatical settlements).
New Jersey:
• Statutes: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30B-1 to -17 (West 2010)
(viatical settlements).
• Regulations: N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:4-35.1 to -.18 (2010)
(viatical settlements).
New Mexico:
• Statutes: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58A-20A-1 to -20A-11
(West 2010) (viatical settlements).
• Regulations: N.M. CODE R. §13.9.15.1 to -.15.17 (Weil
2010) (viatical settlements).
New York:
• Statutes: N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7801-7810 (McKinney 2010)
(life settlements).
• Regulations: N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, §§
380.1-.10 (2010) (viatical settlements).
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North Carolina:
• Statutes: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-200 to -310 (West
2010) (viatical settlements).
• Regulations: 11 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 12.1710 to -.1720
(2010) (viatical settlements).
North Dakota:
• Statutes: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-33.4-01 to -33.4-16
(2010) (life settlements).
• Regulations: N.D. ADMIN. CODE 45-04-13-01 to -13-03
(2010) (viatical settlement advertising).
Ohio:
• Statutes: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3916.01 to -.99 (West
2010) (viatical settlements regulation).
• Regulations: OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3901-1-63 (2010)
(viatical settlements).
Oklahoma:
• Statutes: OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 4055.1 to -.17 (West
2010) (Viatical Settlements Act of 2008).
• Regulations: OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 365:25-11-1 to -11-6
(2010) (viatical settlements).
Oregon:
• Statutes: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 744.319 to -.358 (West
2008) (life settlement contracts).
• Regulations: OR. ADMIN. R. 836-014-0200 to -014-0400
(2010) (life settlements).
Pennsylvania:
• Statutes: 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.1 to -.17 (West
2010) (viatical settlements).
• Regulations: 31 PA. CODE §§ 90f.1-g.16 (2010) (individual
imminent death/lifetime health care facility confinement benefits
provided as accelerated death benefit or settlement of death
benefit; provided by riders or built into policies–statement of
policy).
South Dakota:
• No statutes.
• Regulations: S.D. ADMIN. R. 20:08:07:31 (2010) (viatical
settlements).
Tennessee:
• Statutes: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-50-101 (2010) (Viatical
Settlements Act of 2009).
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• Regulations: TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0780-1-71-.01 to
-.11 (2010) (life settlements).
Texas:
• Statutes: TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1101.001 to .006
(Vernon 2010) (life and viatical settlements).
• Regulations: 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.1701 to .1717
(2010) (viatical and life settlements); 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§
21.101 to .122 (2010) (insurance advertising, certain trade
practices, and solicitation).
Utah:
• Statutes: UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-23a-117 (West 2010)
(special requirements for life settlement providers and producers);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-36-101 to -119 (West 2010) (Life
Settlements Act).
• Regulations: UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 590-222-1 to -222-17
(2010) (viatical settlements); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 590-226-1 to
-226-18 (2010) (submission of life insurance filings).
Vermont:
• No statutes.
• Regulations: 21-020-047 VT. CODE R. § 1 (2010) (viatical
settlements).
Virginia:
• Statutes: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-1865.1 to .5 (2010)
(licensing of viatical settlement brokers); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.26000 to -6016 (2007) (viatical settlements).
• Regulations: 14 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-71-10 to -100
(2010) (viatical settlement providers and viatical settlement
brokers).
Washington:
• No statutes.
• Regulations: WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-97-010 to -050
(2010) (viatical settlements); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 460-10A-215
(2010) (viatical and life settlement agreements).
West Virginia:
• Statutes: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-13C-1 to -18
(LexisNexis 2010) (viatical settlements).
• Regulations: W. VA. CODE R. § 114-80-1 to -12 (2010)
(viatical settlements).
Wisconsin:
• Statutes: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.68 (West 2010) (viatical
settlements).
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APPENDIX B: STATES DEFINING VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS AS SECURITIES
The following states include viatical or life settlements in their
definition of security:
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(32), (37) (2010) (“viatical
settlement interest,” which is further defined as “the entire interest or any
fractional interest in a life insurance policy or in the death benefit under a
life insurance policy that is the subject of a viatical settlement
contract …”).
Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1801(26), (29) (2010) (“viatical or
life settlement investment contract” which is further defined as “an
agreement for consideration for the purchase, assignment, transfer, sale,
devise or bequest of any portion of the death benefit under or ownership of
either an insurance policy or certificate of insurance”).
Arkansas: ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23-42-102 (2010) (“viatical settlement
contract or fractionalized or pooled interest therein”).
California: CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West 2009) (“viatical
settlement contract or a fractionalized or pooled interest therein; life
settlement contract or a fractionalized or pooled interest therein”).
Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-51-201(17), (20) (2010) (“viatical
settlement investment” which is further defined as "the contractual right to
receive any portion of the death benefit or ownership of a life insurance
policy or certificate, in exchange for consideration that is less than the
expected death benefit of the life insurance policy or certificate”).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.021(21), (23) (LexisNexis 2010)
(“viatical settlement investment,” which is further defined as “an
agreement for the purchase, sale, assignment, transfer, devise, or bequest
of all or any portion of a legal or equitable interest in a viaticated policy as
defined in chapter 626”).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2 (2010) (“The term ... [i]ncludes as
an investment contract, among other contracts, an interest in a limited
partnership or a limited liability company and an investment in a viatical
settlement or similar agreement.”).
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Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 485A-102 (2010) (“The
term … [i]ncludes as an ’investment contract’, among other contracts, an
interest in a limited partnership and a limited liability company and an
investment in a viatical settlement or similar agreement.”).
Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-14-102 (2010) (“‘Security’
… [i]ncludes as an ’investment contract,’ among other contracts, an
interest in a limited partnership and a limited liability company and an
investment in a viatical settlement, life settlement or senior settlement or
similar agreement.”).
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-1-2 (LexisNexis 2010) (“The
term … includes as an ‘investment contract’, among other contracts, an
interest in a limited partnership and a limited liability company and an
investment in a viatical settlement or similar agreement.”).
Iowa: IOWA CODE § 502.102(28)(f) (2010) (“viatical settlement
investment contract,” which is further defined in § 502.102 (31A) as “a
contract entered into by a viatical settlement purchaser, to which the viator
is not a party, to purchase a life insurance policy or an interest in the death
benefits of a life insurance policy, which contract is entered into for the
purpose of deriving economic benefit”).
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-12a102(28)(E) (2009) (“‘investment
contract’ may include an interest in a limited partnership and a limited
liability company and shall include a viatical investment as defined by rule
adopted or order issued under this act”).
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.310 (18), (20) (LexisNexis
2010) (“life settlement investment,” which is further defined as “the
contractual right to receive any portion of the death benefit or ownership
of a life insurance policy or certificate, for consideration that is less than
the expected death benefit of the life insurance policy or certificate”).
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16102 (28), ( 32) (2009)
(“investment in a viatical or life settlement contract,” which is further
defined as a “written agreement establishing the terms under which
compensation or anything of value will be paid, which compensation or
value is less than the expected death benefit of the insurance policy or
certificate, in return for the assignment, transfer, sale, devise or bequest of
the death benefit or ownership of any portion of an insurance policy or
certificate of insurance”).
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Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 451.2102 (LexisNexis 2010)
(“‘Security’ means … an investment in a viatical or life settlement
agreement ….”).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 80A.41 (2009) (“The term … includes as
an ‘investment contract,’ among other contracts, an interest in a limited
partnership and a limited liability company and an investment in a viatical
settlement or similar agreement”).
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-71-105(n), (p) (repealed 2010)
(“viatical settlement investment contract or a fractionalized or pooled
interest therein,” which is further defined as “any agreement, regardless of
title or caption, for the purchase, sale, assignment, transfer, devise or
bequest of any portion of the death benefit or ownership of a life insurance
policy or certificate for consideration that is less than the expected death
benefit of the life insurance policy or certificate”).
Missouri: MO. REV. STAT. § 409.1-102(28)(E) (2009) (“May include
as an ‘investment contract’, [sic] among other contracts, an interest in a
limited partnership and a limited liability company and an investment in a
viatical settlement or similar agreement”).
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-103(22)(a) (2009) (“viatical
settlement purchase agreement”).
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1101(15), (17) (2007) (“viatical
settlement contract or any fractional or pooled interest in such contract,”
which is further defined as “an agreement for the purchase, sale,
assignment, transfer, devise, or bequest of all or any portion of the death
benefit or ownership of a life insurance policy or contract for
consideration [sic] which is less than the expected death benefit of the life
insurance policy or contract”).
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.295 (2009) (“viatical settlement
investment”).
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-49(m), (w) (2010) (“a viatical
investment,” which is further defined as “the contractual right to receive
any portion of the death benefit or ownership of a life insurance policy or
certificate, for consideration that is less than the expected death benefit of
the life insurance policy or certificate”).
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New Mexico: N.M. STAT. § 58-13C-102(DD)(7) (2010) (“includes as
an investment contract an investment in a viatical settlement or similar
agreement”).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-2(11), (13) (2009) (“viatical
settlement contract or any fractional or pooled interest in a viatical
settlement contract,” and viatical settlement contract is further defined as
“an agreement for the purchase, sale, assignment, transfer, devise, or
bequest of all or any portion of the death benefit or ownership of a life
insurance policy or contract for consideration which [sic] is less than the
expected death benefit of the life insurance policy or contract”).
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(19), (21) (2009)
(“viatical or life settlement contract or a fractionalized or pooled interest
therein,” which is further defined as “an agreement for the purchase, sale,
assignment, transfer, devise, or bequest of any portion of the death benefit
or ownership of a life insurance policy or certificate, for consideration that
is less than the expected death benefit of the life insurance policy or
certificate”).
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (West 2009) (“any life
settlement interest,” which is further defined in § 1707.01(HH): “‘Life
settlement interest’ means the entire interest or any fractional interest in an
insurance policy or certificate of insurance, or in an insurance benefit
under such a policy or certificate, that is the subject of a life settlement
contract. For purposes of this division, ‘life settlement contract’ means an
agreement for the purchase, sale, assignment, transfer, devise, or bequest
of any portion of the death benefit or ownership of any life insurance
policy or contract, in return for consideration or any other thing of value
that is less than the expected death benefit of the life insurance policy or
contract. ‘Life settlement contract’ includes a viatical settlement
contract ….”).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1-102(32)(e) (2010) (“includes as
an ‘investment contract,’ among other contracts, an interest in a limited
partnership and a third party managed limited liability company and an
investment in a viatical or life settlement or similar contract or
agreement”).
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South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102(29)(E) (2009)
(“‘Investment contract’ may include, among other contracts, an interest in
a limited partnership and a limited liability company and shall include an
investment in a viatical settlement or similar agreement”).
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-31B-102(28)(E) (2010)
(“includes as an investment contract, among other contracts, an interest in
a limited partnership and a limited liability company and an investment in
a viatical settlement or similar agreement”).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2-102(16) (West 2010) (“a life
settlement contract, as defined in former § 56-50-102, or any fractional or
pooled interest in a life insurance policy or life settlement contract”).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-13(ee)(i)(R) (2010) (“life settlement
interest,” which is defined in § 61-1-13(v)(i) as “the entire interest or a
fractional interest in any of the following that is the subject of a life
settlement: (A) a policy; or (B) the death benefit under a policy”).
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5102(28)(E) (2009) (“includes as
an ‘investment contract’ among other contracts an interest in a limited
partnership, a limited liability company, an investment in a viatical
settlement, or similar agreement”).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 32-4-401(n) (2009) (“viatical
settlement contract”).
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. § 551.102(28) (2010) (“viatical settlement
investment or similar agreement,” which is further defined by
§ 551.102(32) as “the entire interest or any fractional or pool interest in a
life insurance policy or certificate of insurance or in the death benefit
thereunder that is the subject of a viatical settlement”).

